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Why should the village of Skokie, Illinois have been forced by the
courts to put up with a march by American Nazis' which seemed to have
no apparent purpose other than to proclaim their anti-Semitism to a cap-
tive audience of Jews, to imply some justification for the Holocaust, to
evoke bitter memories of centuries of European and some American op-
pression, and to enrage and insult inhabitants of the village because of
their religion? Is it because some truth emerges from all debate, even from
debate as inarticulate and primitive as one in this form? Is it because
proponents of hatred and violence have the same protected personal au-
tonomy to express their vituperation as preachers of love and compassion
have to extol the universality of mankind? Or is it because governmental
institutions, including courts, cannot be trusted to draw lines between
what is worthless and what is worthwhile, so that every form and content
of expression (assuming that there is, indeed, an expression of ideas or
positions in an event such as the Skokie march) must be protected at
whatever cost?
These are familiar questions in classrooms and courts concerned with
speech clause2 problems. Such questions, as well as the answers they sug-
gest, evoke the great names of the First Amendment theorists and their
intellectual forebears-Milton, Mill, Holmes, Brandeis, Chafee,
• Professor of Law, University of Michigan.
SNicholas deB. Katzenbach Professor of Law, Yale University.
1. Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 916 (1978); Village of Skokie
v. National Socialist Party of Am., 69 Il. 2d 605, 373 N.E.2d 21 (1978).
2. U.S. CoNsM. amend. I, cl. 2.
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Meiklejohn, Emerson, Kalven-as well as many of their less central
commentators. Professor Bollinger has produced a book intended to thrust
himself into this group. He immediately states his "dissatisfaction with the
current explanations and theories for the modern concept of freedom of
speech."4 He carefully proceeds to expound and examine the sources of
his dissatisfaction, to tease out at some length the flaws, or at least the
incompleteness, of each approach. Finally, he wants to discover the com-
ponents of a general theory of speech, based on a general tolerance theory,
that is not only less vulnerable to analytic criticism, but also universal in
its application.
To give this ambitious book the serious consideration it clearly deserves
involves three tasks. One is to evaluate the quality of Bollinger's dissection
of the theories of Milton, Mill, and their successors. The second is to ask
whether, and how, Bollinger's general theory of tolerance strengthens
those theories, unifies them, and extends their compass. The third is to
attempt to fit his accomplishment into what is going on in American legal
practice, and in academic discussion, both of which are little concerned
with the classic paradox of protecting extremist speech, the centerpiece of
the Bollinger structure.
I.
The easiest part of Bollinger's job is the first task, for no general theory
of the special protection of speech required by the First Amendment will
explain all the major decisions of the Supreme Court in the field, much
less the infinite hypothetical variations they raise.
The Skokie case, as Bollinger keeps insisting, could only in the most
rarefied academic thinking be understood as contributing to the "free
trade" and "competition of the market" in ideas necessary to democratic
self-government.' No idea was expressed in any cognitive sense. Behind
the Skokie march was the evocation, in the most provocative manner, of a
period of history totally repugnant to any concept of democratic self-
3. See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 372 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring); Gitlow v. New
York, 268 U.S. 652, 672 (1925) (Holmes, J., joined by Brandeis, J., dissenting); Abrams v. United
States, 250 U.S. 616, 624 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting); Z. CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED
S'ATUS (1941) [hereinafter Z. CHAFFE, FREE SPEECH]; Z. CHAFEE, FREEDOM OF SPEECH (1920); T.
EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION (1970); A. MEIKLEJOHN, Free Speech and Its
Relation to Self-Government, in PoI.rrICAi. FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS OF THE
PEoPI.E (1960); J.S. MIL.L, ON LIBERTY (1873); J. Mx:rON, AREOPAGITICA Q. Hales ed. 1917)
(1644); Chafee, Freedom of Speech in War Time, 32 HARV. L. REV. 932 (1919); Kalven, The New
York Times Case: A Note on "The Central Meaning of the First Amendment," 1964 Sup. CT. REV.
191; Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is an Absolute, 1961 Sup. CT. REV. 245.
4. L. BOL.INCER, THE TOLERANT SOCETY 3 (1986) [hereinafter by page number only). Bollin-
ger clearly intends to encompass the theories of all those mentioned in supra note 3.
5. Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
1688
Vol. 96: 1687, 1987
Love Vituperation
government, or human freedom. The case does not fit under the rubric of
"uninhibited, robust, and wide-open"' debate on public issues that has
become for many "the central meaning of the First Amendment." 7 Cohen
v. California,8 surely in some sense a glorious moment in free speech
history, may be the proper model: protection for Cohen's (and the neo-
Nazis') personal autonomy to say whatever he wants, in whatever form,
no matter how virulent, wrong-headed, or offensive the speech may be to
the speaker's audience. The words on Cohen's jacket concerning the draft
may or may not have expressed his own views on the subject, but certainly
they did not contribute to the debate in any meaningful way. Moreover,
the views could have been, and were in fact, communicated in other ways.
Yet, this notion of protecting personal liberty does not explain, as Bol-
linger also keeps insisting, why words, and acts with the communicative
effect of words, should be specially protected (beyond the fact that speech
happens to be explicitly mentioned in the Constitution), compared to other
forms of personal behavior, also expressions of personal autonomy, which
may be disgusting, revolting, or immoral to many members of the general
public exposed to them, or, as in Bowers v. Hardwick,9 not even exposed
to them. Nor does such protection of personal liberty explain such cases as
First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti.10 The idea that the Court was
giving special protection to acts of personal autonomy of a bank is plainly
preposterous."
These problems, framed in somewhat different and more sophisticated
terms, constitute the core of the first three chapters of Bollinger's book.
The discussion is coherent, intelligent, and written with clarity, precision,
and well-developed insights. It is mostly a critical, historical discussion of
First Amendment theory, but framed against a background that lawyers,
judges, and legal academics easily overlook in arguing about legal and
judicial theory. In the field of free speech, legal and judicial theory is
almost always inconsistent with societal reactions to the issues. The theo-
ries raise, in Bollinger's words, "the problem of the disjunction between
our attitudes about the limits of nonlegal coercion toward speech behavior
and our attitudes about the limits of legal coercion toward the same
behavior." 2
6. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
7. Kalven, supra note 3, at 191.
8. 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
9. 106 S. Ct. 2841 (1986) (upholding Georgia sodomy statute barring private homosexual conduct
in home).
10. 435 U.S. 765 (1978) (statute barring corporate expenditures for purpose of influencing votes
on referendum violates First Amendment).
II. See id. at 777.
12. P. 39. In this phrase, and in others throughout the book, Bollinger is annoyingly loose in the
use of pronouns of the first person plural: "we," "our," and "us." One is never clear whether he
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The introductory chapter appropriately raises the questions of why
speech behavior should be specially protected by law, and if by law, why
by the courts rather than by the legislature, which expresses the will of
the people. As noted, the formal answer is the existence of the speech
clause, but this is not sufficient, for no one concedes that it is a limitless
license to do harm. Bollinger makes effective use of the little-known con-
temporaneous attack by John Wigmore,' 3 Dean at Northwestern Law
School and scholarly eminence in the field of evidence, on Holmes' dissent
in Abrams, 4 and in particular, on Holmes' concept of the "free trade in
ideas,""5 as well as his formulation of the clear and present danger test.
Holmes' mistake, according to Wigmore (although I do not see how it can
be squared with Holmes' votes and opinions in Goldman,"
6 Schenck,17
Frohwerk,'8 and Debs'9 ), was to ignore the true harm from speech behav-
ior, and to overestimate the damage done to the concept of freedom of
speech by governmental control. If accepted, the Holmes approach would
have caused fundamental damage to the implementation of important gov-
ernmental policies, especially in time of war. For example, Holmes was
insensitive to " '[tlhe national agonies' "20 caused by the action of people
like Abrams to the national effort to produce munitions.2 For all his ef-
forts to protect free speech from governmental control, Holmes was, in
Wigmore's words, a "'Don Quixote, fighting giants and ogres who have
long since been laid in the dust.'"22 To Wigmore, in other words, the
struggle for freedom had already been won a century before, and the pun-
ishment of some "puny anonymities" 3 preaching dangerous programs of
action could not possibly undo the outcome.
Bollinger's point is that this almost-seventy-year-old debate is not ab-
surd, however uncongenial it might appear to much current academic and
judicial scholarship. Bollinger is right, and he does a service to speech
clause scholarship to revive the old debate so forcefully. The essence of the
means government expressing itself through law, legal theorists, people who think like himself, or
some unspecified poll-like sample of Americans.
13. Pp. 15, 18-23 (citing Wigmore, Abrams v. U.S.: Freedom of Speech and Freedom of Thug-
gery in War-Time and Peace-Time, 14 Iu.. L. R.v. 539 (1920)).
14. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 624 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (arguing for First
Amendment protection for anti-war leaflets).
15. Id. at 630.
16. Goldman v. United States, 245 U.S. 474 (1918) (unanimous decision upholding Selective
Draft Law and criminal prosecution for conspiracy against registration).
17. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919) (opinion of Holmes, J.) (unanimous Court
upholding prosecution for anti-war conspiracy under Espionage Act).
18. Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204 (1919) (same).
19. Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919) (same).
20. P. 19 (quoting Wigmore, supra note 13, at 549).
21. Pp. 19-20.
22. P. 21 (quoting Wigmore, supra note 13, at 558).
23. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 629 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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debate is simply a line-drawing claim, as Bollinger points out, and line-
drawing claims are common to all judicial law-making. Line-drawing
claims also are concerned with assessing underlying facts and policies be-
cause an ostensible purpose may serve "as a convenient disguise for other
purposes and motivations." '24 For Bollinger, this analysis does not answer
the Skokie case.25 It is not enough to say that the courts put more weight
on the harm done to freedom by suppression of the march and less weight
on the damage caused by the expression of such views. All of the judges
who considered the case expressed their extreme distaste for the outcome
they reached, and insisted that they reached it only because of the law, the
Constitution. Bollinger, at heart a First Amendment buff, must pursue
other explanations.
In Chapter Two, he turns to the "classical model" for an answer. The
classical model, according to Bollinger, is that freedom of speech-full po-
litical debate-is critical for democratic self-government. Only then will
people be able to see all of their choices clearly and make decisions wisely.
It is a model associated with all the First Amendment theorists. Bollinger
uses the classical model primarily as an introduction to the writings of
Chafee,2" Meiklejohn,27 and Mill." The book gives due deference to the
major premises of this model: that confrontation with falsehood may be
valuable in fortifying truth, 9 and that there is an informational gain from
having falsehood expressed.3" These points are wholly separate from the
skeptic's position that no one knows what the truth is, or even that there
is a truth. Bollinger, however, finds two persistent flaws in the model, one
perhaps a verbal trick more than a real fallacy, and the other quite per-
suasive. The trick is a paradox: If the core of concern is the protection of
democratic self-government, how can one justify preventing people from
governing themselves through self-imposed limits on their own speech?
The more valuable insight, often overlooked or at least insufficiently ex-
plained, is that intolerance of speech communicates as much as an act of
tolerance. There is what Bollinger calls an act of self-definition in com-
munity acceptance of speech, such as in the case of the Skokie march, a
kind of mandated tolerance of Nazi ideas and Nazi history, which is ines-
24. P. 37.
25. P. 38.
26. Pp. 46-47 (citing Z. CHAFE.E, FRE.. SI'EFH, supra note 3).
27. Pp. 46-48 (citing Meiklejohn, supra note 3). In Chapter Five, Bollinger makes clear that his
opinion of Meiklejohn's theory is quite low. Pp. 164-74.
28. Pp. 54-55 (citing J.S. Mu.., supra note 3, at 21).
29. P. 54 (citing J.S. Mu.., supra note 3, at 21).
30. P. 55 (citing Z. CHAFF.I., FRIE Si,.cn, supra note 3, at 33; A. MEIKI.FJOHN, supra note 3,
at 26).
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capable from the decision to let the march proceed. These factors make
the "classical model" unacceptable to Bollinger as a general theory.
Bollinger's analysis then turns, in Chapter Three, to the "fortress
model." Bollinger's fortress model includes all of the variations of speech
theory that have as their premise a view of government, excepting the
judiciary, as having an inherent "atavistic longing" for repression.3" Bol-
linger has two difficulties with the premise. The first, which is an unsub-
stantiated empirical judgment even with respect to the United States and
sounds a bit like Wigmore's attack on Holmes, is that it is simply "out of
proportion to its reality as an actual problem."32 The second difficulty is
analytical. Bollinger notes that the premise assumes government to be a
kind of uncontrollable machine that works by itself-power begetting
power-rather than as an instrument responsive to the people. This view
is inconsistent with the notion of democratic self-government, and with
Bollinger's own premise, drawn in part from the writings of Walter Bage-
hot.33 Bollinger's premise is that the real problem is the intolerance of the
people to certain ideas and speech, not that government is separated in
policy and behavior from the governed. According to his view, the role of
the judiciary also becomes problematic as long as such intolerance exists;
in forcing acceptance of the Skokie march, for example, the judiciary is
protecting the people from themselves, not from some remote center of
oppression.
In this way, Bollinger prepares the reader for his revelation. He has
attempted to show that the approaches of his predecessors do not work in
the end. They look at speech theory from three perspectives: the protection
of the speaker as an individual, the protection of speech as an instrument
of self-government, and the protection of the people from governmental
oppression. As I understand Bollinger, his contribution is to escape to an-
other vantage point, from which he explains and justifies the special pro-
tection given extremist speech, such as that at Skokie, in terms of its con-
tribution to the good society rather than its instrumental value for
individuals or the political system. Neither speaker, hearer, nor govern-




33. P. 81 (citing W. BAEHo'r, The Metaphysical Basis of Toleration, in 2 THE WORKS OF
WAI:NER BA;FHIo'r 340 (1891) ("Most men have always much preferred persecution, and do so still
. ..1)
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II.
"The quest for the tolerant mind" 4 and the protection of speech as
part of a general theory of tolerance are the foundations of Bollinger's
thesis. Its very statement is so imprecise that my initial response was that
I like tolerance as well as the next person, as Justice Black had said of the
right to privacy discovered in Griswold v. Connecticut."5 But how can the
obvious connection between the protection of extremist speech and toler-
ance for diverse, even radical and extreme, views possibly explain any-
thing that was missed by Milton, Mill, Holmes, Brandeis, and Chafee? I
am still not sure that Bollinger actually fills in a gap, but the development
of his thesis demonstrates intense thought and careful analysis, and must
for that reason alone be considered a significant addition to the literature.
At the least, Bollinger's thesis starts from a different perspective than ac-
cepted speech theory, and contributes to, even if it does not create, justifi-
cations for strong judicial interference in governmental controls of unpop-
ular expression. It adds, in short, "another function" 6 to be taken into
account, in addition to those already identified.
One premise Bollinger states about people, rather than about govern-
ment as in the fortress model, is the "assumed reality of an impulse to
intolerance"37 that is often excessive. This premise is put forth as a gener-
ality and is not confined to speech behavior. Speech, in the model, is spe-
cially protected as a means of developing in the public a more general
capacity for tolerance, which is assumed to be a good. Why is speech spe-
cially protected, as opposed to other kinds of behavior that also trigger the
impulse to intolerance? Because speech behavior can be said to create less
individual and social injury.38
Here, as in other places, Bollinger develops his own thesis while ignor-
ing points he had previously made when criticizing others' theories. For
example, Bollinger began the book by making the point that speech can
and sometimes does cause severe harm. But why protect extremist speech,
such as that of the Nazis in Skokie? The answers Bollinger provides 9
seem to the casual reader (including me) to resemble the answers given to
this question by earlier speech theorists: Such protection teaches a particu-
larly strong lesson about tolerance; it develops an ethic against control of
speech; case-by-case differentiations are too hard to make; the motivation
towards repression is a bad thing, and tolerating repression has a simi-
34. P. 104. This is the title of Chapter Four.
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larly harmful effect on societal self-definition as does tolerating the
preaching of racial hatred; finally, the protection of extremist speech
shows what "we"4 aspire to as a society. The judicial branch is particu-
larly suited-in fact indispensable-to this task for familiar reasons, 41 in-
cluding its "posture of choicelessness, ' 42 fervently stressed by the judges in
the Skokie case.43 However, Bollinger suggests that for other modern theo-
rists the "focus [is] less on the worthiness of speech activity as a basis for
protection and more on something potentially problematic in the public
response to speech acts." 44
This, then, is in summary form the Bollinger general theory of freedom
of expression, devised as a subset of a general theory of tolerance. The
remainder of the book purports to justify the theory in the context of the
earlier literature, to identify its implications in other First Amendment
contexts, and to give the theory a fuller voice in current practice.
In Chapter Five Bollinger rewrites, so to speak, Holmes and
Meiklejohn, and finds in both "a recapitulation of the general tolerance
function of free speech."'45 I find this interpretation unconvincing, in view
of Holmes' recognized "well-known skepticism,"4 6 "intellectual stance of
self-doubt,"' 7 and many reservations about tolerance as well as intoler-
ance, and Meiklejohn's image of American society as some sort of gigantic
town meeting.
48
Chapter Six, in turn, attempts to trace the implications of the tolerance
function for certain recognized forms of line drawing, and of exceptions to
speech theory, which all speech theories must address. The chapter is en-
titled "Drawing Lines and the Virtues of Ambiguity," and if there are
positive, instead of only necessary, virtues to ambiguity, the chapter cer-
tainly demonstrates that they exist in Bollinger's general theory of toler-
ance as well as elsewhere. There is a discussion of the fighting words
cases,49 but I cannot see what the Bollinger view says about them that is
unique. There is also a discussion of the place of pornography and ob-
scenity in First Amendment theory.50 I can see the relevance of tolerance
in that area, but in some ways tolerance seems peculiarly misplaced. One
can imagine the rage that some like feminist scholar Catharine MacKin-
40. See supra note 12.
41. Pp. 133-37.
42. P. 137.









Vol. 96: 1687, 1987
Love Vituperation
non51 must feel at the notion that pornography should be protected, so
that it can reflect society's tolerance of the stereotypes about and subordi-
nation of women that pornography perpetuates. There is a discussion of
the constitutionality of the law of defamation, 52 but again Bollinger fails
to inform the reader how his theory of tolerance would apply. There is no
recognition, much less resolution, of the grave difficulties the application
of the Sullivan rule53 and its progeny have created in actual litigation, as
is so graphically and intelligently demonstrated in Renata Adler's book on
the Westmoreland and Sharon trials.54 Finally, there is a brief essay on
time, place, and manner regulations, based chiefly on an analysis of John
Ely's work,55 which also appears to gain little from the major theses of the
Bollinger book.
Aside from a wrap-up in Chapter Eight, which I take to be an outline
for a future book, The Tolerant Society ends with a discourse on "the
right voice" (Chapter Seven), the kind of rhetoric needed, presumably by
the judiciary, to expound the theory of tolerance. Bollinger is wary of the
"rhetorical beauty ' 56 and "'almost uncanny power' ",51 of free speech the-
ory, particularly as it exists in the extraordinarily powerful dissents of
Brandeis and Holmes. Without quite saying so, Bollinger seems to sympa-
thize with Bork's characterization of Brandeis' and Holmes' command of
language, which has "'the power, almost half a century later, to swamp
analysis, to persuade, almost to command assent.' "58 Bollinger's own
prose does not have that quality; it is analytic, clear, somewhat repetitious,
and hesitant.
Throughout the book, and in this last chapter particularly, Bollinger
appears to think of courts and the law as instruments for education in the
grand sense, rather than as instruments of government. Thus, he deferen-
tially complains about the deceptive appearance that judges often adopt of
51. See generally C. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW
127-213 (1987).
52. Pp. 185-86.
53. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (showing of actual malice in making
defamatory falsehood required for public official to receive damages).
54. R. Am.ER, RECK. ss DISRI;ARD (1986). Adler's book is controversial because of her
powerfully critical treatment of the behavior of the establishment press (CBS and Time) and bar
(especially the noted law firm, Cravath, Swaine & Moore). However, it clearly and without dispute
demonstrates that the Sullivan rule simply does not work (maybe no rule could) to divert the intracta-
ble impulse towards enormously expensive, protracted, and predictably futile litigation, when such
large-scale institutional interests are at stake.
55. Pp. 204-12; see Ely, Flag Desecration: A Case Study in the Roles of Categorization and
Balancing in First Amendment Analysis, 88 HARV. L. REv. 1482 (1975).
56. P. 213.
57. Id. (quoting H. KAI.VEN, THE NEGRo AND THE FIRsr AMENDMENT 13 (1965)).
58. Id. (quoting Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1,
24 (1971)).
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total personal disengagement,5 about their efforts to "appear choice-
less,"60 and about their disassociation of themselves from the speech acts
in the matter before them.61 All of this should be avoided, it seems to him,




I have two major, though qualified, reservations about the Bollinger
thesis. One is that he assumes, rather than demonstrates, that tolerance is
a pre-eminent, indeed overriding, value in American society. I have no
quarrel with that premise; it is an assumption I share, and in which I
deeply believe. Yet, it is such a major premise, and one so intrinsic to the
rest of the book, that even if it cannot be proved without constructing an
entire theory of a just society, it at least requires extensive justification.
The other reservation, of course, is that I am still unconvinced that the
theory leads anywhere new (although I also am not convinced of the
opposite).
There are other problems, too, having to do not with the execution or
thesis of the book, but with its very subject matter. The book is about
protecting extremist speech, and the prototypical case is Skokie,6 3 involving
the Skokie march. I agree that this is an appropriate setting for ex-
pounding a new general speech theory to be measured against other
speech theories, but it is a timely and directly relevant text only if two
things are true. One is that protection of extremist speech is in fact central
to First Amendment history, and therefore, needs to be explained. The
other is that the constitutional position of extremist speech is a core prob-
lem in current First Amendment theory and practice. I do not believe
either proposition is accurate.
Certainly, it cannot be said that the history of First Amendment doc-
trine is one of protecting extremist speech. The great dissenting opinions
of Holmes and Brandeis are just that-dissenting opinions-and, except





63. Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 916 (1978); Village of
Skokie v. National Socialist Party of Am., 69 Ill. 2d 605, 373 N.E.2d 21 (1978).
64. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 372 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (setting up rela-
tively stringent standard for application of clear and present danger test). Although technically a
concurrence, the Brandeis opinion was prepared for a dissent in another case, which was mooted by
the death of the petitioner, a Communist named Ruthenberg. Cover, The Left, the Right and the First
Amendment: 1918-1928, 40 Mn. L. RF:v. 349, 384-86 (1981).
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ist speech except at the fringe, for "puny anonymities" who could not, in
fact, be heard. Even the clear and present danger test was never accepted
by the Court in the form in which it was proposed. The Skokie66 case fits
into that tradition, as does the much-heralded, but never applied, Bran-
denburg v. Ohio.17 The story of important extremist speech is instead that
of the successful suppression of the Communist Party,"8 with judicial pro-
tection afforded only to inactive party members who were not shown to
have spoken at all.
Nor is suppression of extremist speech of current importance to the
work of the courts or academics in this area. The core problems now, as
Professor Fiss has been insisting, stem from the Court's inexplicable
equation of money with speech, 9 and include the inability of both the
Court and First Amendment theorists to recognize that the marketplace of
ideas, and particularly the political process, is largely closed. 70 In the
print media and television, voices other than those of government, of the
great media corporations, and of those with money to advertise, are sel-
dom heard. A subsidiary doctrinal dilemma is the extraordinarily thought-
less inclusion of commercial speech in the general ambit of First Amend-
ment protection, with the Lochner-like7' emanations that this step implies.
If Bollinger's general theory of tolerance, with its powerful implications
for free speech doctrine, is to have continued vitality, someone-probably
Bollinger himself-is going to have to articulate what it means in these
modern contexts.
65. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 629 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
66. Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 916 (1978); Village of
Skokie v. National Socialist Party of Am., 69 Ill. 2d 605, 373 N.E.2d 21 (1978).
67. 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (purporting to overrule Whitney v. California, Court held mere advocacy
of use of force without imminent danger was protected).
68. See, e.g., People v. Ruthenberg, 229 Mich. 315, 201 N.W. 358 (1924), writ of error dis-
missed, 273 U.S. 782 (1927).
69. See Fiss, Free Speech and Social Structure, 71 IOWA L. REv. 1405, 1410-15 (1986); see also
Fiss, Why the State?, 100 HARV. L. REV. 781, 787-88 (1987) (market alone does not encourage full
debate needed for democracy).
70. Bollinger is perfectly aware of this problem. See Bollinger, Freedom of the Press and Public
Access: Toward a Theory of Partial Regulation of the Mass Media, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1, 2 (1976).
71. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (striking state limitation on employment hours
as violative of freedom to contract under Fourteenth Amendment).
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Although the Yale Law Journal circulates primarily in
the legal community-one of the many academies to
which Bob Cover belonged-the editors offer this issue
not only as a tribute to the insight and breadth of Bob
Cover's legal scholarship. His writings, though tragically
few, need no such remembrance. Ranging from Justice
Accused's gaze into moral choice to Nomos and Narra-
tive's account of human aspiration, Bob Cover's own voice
will speak to us far into the future. Rather, the tribute
strives to grasp at the wholeness of Bob Cover's life, to
illustrate how his example challenged colleagues and stu-
dents alike to strike out in all directions, with courage.
Yale Law School introduced many of us to Bob, but
neglected to warn that time to study with or befriend him
would be short. Preparation of this issue has provided a
way to express the depth of our loss. We thank the con-
tributors for exploring in their addresses and essays con-
nections to Bob Cover that we can share.
The Yale Law Journal
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